Abstract. Dierential Power Analysis (DPA) on smart-cards was introduced by Paul Kocher [11] in 1998. Since, many countermeasures have been introduced to protect cryptographic algorithms from DPA attacks. Unfortunately these features are known not to be ecient against high order DPA (even of second order). In these paper we will rst describe new specialized rst order attack and remind how are working high order DPA attacks. Then we will show how these attacks can be applied to two usual actual countermeasures. Eventually we will present a method of protection (and apply it to the DES) which seems to be secure against any order DPA type attacks. The gures of a real implementation of this method will be given too.
Introduction
The framework of Dierential Power Analysis (also known as DPA) was introduced by P. Kocher, B. Jun and J. Jae in 1998 ( [11] ) and subsequently published in 1999 ( [12] ). The initial focus was on symmetrical cryptosystems such as DES (see [11, 14, 1] ) and the AES candidates (see [3, 4, 7] ), but public key cryptosystems have since also been shown to be also vulnerable to the DPA attacks (see [15, 6, 9, 10, 16] ).
Two main families of countermeasures against DPA are known:
In [9, 10] , L. Goubin and J. Patarin described a generic countermeasure consisting in splitting all the intermediate variables, using the secret sharing principle. This duplication method was also proposed shortly after by S. Chari et al. in [4] and [5] .
In [2] , M.-L. Akkar and C. Giraud introduced the transformed masking method, an alternative countermeasure to the DPA. The basic idea is to perform all the computation such that all the data are XORed with a random mask. Moreover, the tables (e.g. the DES S-Boxes) are modied such that the output of a round is masked by the same mask as the input.
Both these methods have been proven secure against the initial DPA attacks, and are now widely used in real life implementations of many algorithms. However, they do not take into consideration more elaborated attacks called High-order DPA. These attacks, as described in [11] by P. Kocher or in [13] by T. Messerges, consist in studying correlations between the secret data and several points of the electric consumption curves (instead of single points for the basic DPA attack).
In what follows, we study the impact of the High-order DPA attacks on both countermeasures mentioned above. Moreover, we describe new secure ways of implementing a whole class of algorithms (including DES) against these new attacks.
The paper is organized as follows:
In section 2, we recall three basic notions: the (high-order) dierential power analysis, the duplication method and the transformed masking method.
In Section 3, we study duplication method and show that an implementation of DES (or AES), which splits all the variables into n sub-variables is still vulnerable to an n-th order DPA attack. Section 3.1 gives the general principle of the attack and section 3.2 discusses practical aspects. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the transformed masking (see [2] ). For such an implementation of DES, section 4.1 describes how a second order DPA can work. A new variant we call the superposition attack is also presented. In section 4.2, we show that an AES (=Rijndael) implementation protected with the transformed masking method can also be attacked, either by second order DPA, or by the Zero problem attack.
Section 5 presents our new generic countermeasure: the unique masking method. We illustrate it on the particular case of DES. In 5.1, we explain the main idea of unique mask. In 5.2, we apply it to the full protection of a DES implementation. The security of this implementation against n-th order DPA attacks is investigated in sections 5.3 and 5.4. Section 6 focuses on the problem of securely constructing the modied S-Boxes used in our new countermeasure. The details of the algorithm are presented, together with practical impacts on the amount of time and memory needed.
In Section 7, we give our conclusions.
Background

The (High-Order) Dierential Power Analysis
In basic DPA attack (see [11, 12] , or [8] ), also known as rst-order DPA (or DPA when there is no risk of confusion), the attacker records the power consumption signals and compute statistical properties of the signal for each individual instant of the computation. This attack does not require any knowledge about the individual electric consumption of each instruction, nor about the position in time of each of these instructions. It only relies on the following fundamental hypothesis (quoted from [10] ):
Fundamental hypothesis (order 1): There exists an intermediate vari-
able, that appears during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows us to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for this variable.
In this paper, we consider the so-called High-Order Dierential Power Analysis attacks (HODPA), which generalize the rst-order DPA: the attacker now compute statistical correlations between the electrical consumptions considered at several instants. More precisely, an "n-th order" DPA attack takes into account n values of the consumption signal, which correspond to n intermediate values occurring during the computation. These attacks now rely on the following fundamental hypothesis (in the spirit of [10] ):
Fundamental hypothesis (order n): There exists a set of n intermediate variables, that appear during the computation of the algorithm, such that knowing a few key bits (in practice less than 32 bits) allows us to decide whether two inputs (respectively two outputs) give or not the same value for a known function of these n variables.
The "Duplication" Method
The "duplication method" was initially suggested by L. Goubin and J. Patarin in [9] , and studied further in [4, 10, 5] . It basically consists in splitting the data (manipulated during the computation) into several parts, using a secret sharing scheme, and computing a modied algorithm on each part to recombine the nal result at the end. For example, a way of splitting X into two parts can consist in choosing a random R and splitting X into (X ⊕ R) and R.
The "Transformed Masking" Method
The "Transformed Masking" Method was introduced in [2] by M.-L. Akkar and C. Giraud. The basic idea is to perform all the computation that all the data are XORed with a random mask. By using suitably modied tables (for instance S-Boxes in the case of DES), it is possible to have the output of a round masked by exactly the same mask that masked the input. The computation is thus divided into two main steps: the rst one consists in generating the modied tables and the second one consists in applying the usual computation using these modied tables (the initial input being masked before starting the computation and the nal output being unmasked after the computation). depends. From these 6 key bits, he computes for each E i the expected value for b. he then computes the mean curve CM' δ of all the C i,δ such that the expected b equals 0, and CM δ the mean curve of all the other C i,δ 4. If CM' δ and CM δ do not show any appreciable dierence, go back to 3 with another choice for the 6 key bits. 5. If no choice for the 6 key bits was satisfactory, go back to 2, with another choice for δ. 6. Iterate the steps 2, 3, 4, 5 with two bits whose exclusive-or comes from the second S-Box, the third S-Box, ..., until the eighth S-Box. 7. Find the 8 remaining key bits by exhaustive search.
The Attack in Practice
As specied in the original paper [10] , it is clear that the n-th duplication is vulnerable to an n-th order DPA attack. An important point is to notice that if the method is not carefully implemented, it will be easily detected on the consumption curve, just by identifying n repetitive parts in the calculus. In this case, it would be easy for the attacker to just superpose the dierent parts of the curves (in a constant, or proportional to log(n), time, but not exponential in n). Moreover, in certain scenarios, the attacker has full access to the very details of the implementation. In particular, for high-level security certications (ITSEC, Common Criteria), it is assumed that the attacker knows the contents of the smartcard ROM. 
Where EP represents the Expansion Permutation, and P −1 the inverse of the P permutation after the S-Boxes. We can see that using this formula the output mask of the value at the end of a DES round is nearly R. To get exactly the R masked value, the left part of the value has to be remasked with R 0−31 ⊕ R 32−64 . It is clear, like noticed in the article, than this countermeasure is subject to a second-order DPA attack. Indeed, the real output of the S-boxes is correlated to the masked value and the value R ; so getting the electrical trace of these two values one can combine them and get a trace on which will work a classical DPA attack. In order to perform eciently such an attack, without need of n 2 point like in the general attack, the attacker should get precise information about the implementation of the algorithm: he should know precisely where the interesting values are manipulated.
Superposition Attack:
In this section we will present a new kind of DPA attack. In theory it is a second-order DPA attack; but in practice it is nearly as simple as an usual DPA attack. The idea is the following: in a second order DPA the most dicult thing is to localize the time where the precise needed values are manipulated. On the contrary localizing a whole DES round is often quite easy. So instead of correlating precise part of the consumption traces we will just correlate the whole trace of the rst and the last round. With these method one can notices than at one moment we will have the trace consumption T of the following value which is the output S-Boxes values:
Where R is the right part of the mask permutated by the expansion permutation. One can notice that the T value does not depend of the random masking value and than R 1 and R 15 1 are often known. Considering this, it is easy to sea that performing a guess on the 2×6 bits of the subkey of the rst and last round, it is possible to guess the XORed value of the output of the S-Boxes of the rst and last round. After that once can perform an usual DPA-type attack attacker and nd the values of the dierent sub-keys of K 1 and K 16 . Due to redundancy of the key-bits one can moreover check the coherency of the results: indeed with such an attack one will nd 2 × 6 × 8 = 96 >> 56 bits for the key. The detailed algorithm is the following:
Correlate (usually an addition or subtraction of the curves) the rst and last round traces.
For All the messages M, For the S-box j = 1..8 For k=0 to 63, For l=0 to 63 Separate the Messages , considering one bit of the XOR values of the output of the j th Sbox (round 1 and 16) for the message M considering that the subkey of the S-Box j of the rst round is k, and the subkey of the S-Box j of the last round is l.
Average and subtract the separated curves. Choose the value k, l where the greatest peak appear. Check the coherency of the keybits found.
A cautionary look of the attack could convince the reader that any error of one bit on the guess of K 1 or K 16 eliminate all the correlation. Comparing to an usual second order DPA attack, even if this attack require the analyze of 2 12 = 4096 possibilities, it has the advantage not to need a precise knowing of the code. And from a complexity point of view it increases by a constant factor (2 6 = 64) the amount of time and memory needed for the attacker and not by a linear factor.
Conclusion:
The superposition attack, even if it is a theoretical second order attack is very ecient in practice. Therefore to use transformed masking method, one must use dierent masks at each step of the algorithm. This idea have been developed and adapted to produce the protection described in this article.
AES
For the AES, the countermeasure is nearly the same than in DES. The only dierence is that no transformed tables are used for the non-linear part of the AES (the inversion in the eld GF(256)) but the same table with a multiplicative mask. The distributivity of the multiplication over XOR (addition in the eld) is used. So from an additive mask it is easy, without unmasking the value, to switch to a multiplicative one, to go through the Sboxes and to get back to an the mask.
Usual Second
Order DPA: For AES it is exactly the same than in the DES transformed masking method. Correlating the masked value and the mask allow an eective attack against this method.
4.2.2
The "Zero" problem: Because a multiplicative mask is used during the inversion, one can see that if the inverted value is zero -and this value just depend of 8 bits of the key in the rst and last roundthen whatever is the masking value, the inverted value will be unmasked. Therefore if someone is able to detect in the consumption trace that the value is zero instead of a random masked value, one will be able to break such an implementation. Of course probabilistic tools such as variance analysis are devoted to such analysis.
Superposition Method:
As in the DES, one can say that using the same superposition method it would be possible to nd the key 16 bits by 16 bits superposing the rst and last round of AES because these are using the same mask. Unfortunately after the last round a last subkey is added to the output of the round. So the attacker need at least to guess 8 more bits of the key. It increase the attacker amount of work to 24 bits for each Sbox. In theory it is not a quadratic attack in the number of samples but in practice it is not so easy to perform more than 16 billions manipulation of the curve for each tables and each message.
Conclusion:
Judging by these attacks we can consider that the adaptive mask countermeasure on AES is not ecient even against some simpler attack than second order ones.
Unique Masking Method Principle
We have seen that the actual countermeasure against DPA are intrinsically vulnerable to high order DPA. Often the order of vulnerability is two, and even when it is theoretically more; practically it is one or two. In the next section we will present a method to protect the DES that seem to be ecient against any order DPA attacks. We will rst describe the elementary steps of the method for after see how to construct a complete secure DES and why it seems to be secure.
Masked Rounds
Given any 32 bits value α we will dene two new functionsS 1 andS 2 based on the Sboxes function S.
where E is the expansion permutation and P −1 is the inverse of the permutation after the Sboxes. We dene f K i to be the composition of E, the XOR of the i th round subkey K i the Sboxes and the permutation P . We then denef 1,K i andf 2,K i by replacing S byS 1 andS 2 in f .
Remark We can see thatf 1 gives an unmasked value from a α-masked value and that,f 2 gives a α-masked result from an unmasked one. Using the function f ,f 1 andf 2 one can obtain 5 dierent rounds using masked/unmasked values. The gure 1 represents these ve dierent rounds. The plain ll represents the unmasked value and the dashed ll represents masked values.
The following automata (cf g. 2) shows how these rounds are compatible with each other. The input states are the rounds where the input is unmasked (A and B) and the output states are the one where the output of the rounds are unmasked (A and E). 
Complete DES with Masked Rounds
It is easy to see that one could obtain a 16 round complete DES with these requirements. IP − BCDCDCEBCDCDCDCE − F P represents a correct example (IP represents the initial permutation of DES and FP the nal one).
Security Requirements
In all this section we will consider that the modied Sboxes are already constructed and that the mask α changes at each DES computation.
The rst step is to analyze in the DES of how many key bits depends the bits of the data at each round. This simple analyze is summarized in the gure 3. We have also considered that the clear and the cipher were known, explaining the symmetry of the gure. To get a correct security we have considered that the critical data are the one where the bits are dependant of less than 36 2 bits of the key. So we can see that only two parts have to be protected: the one connecting R 2 and L 3 and the one connecting R 15 and L 16 . We dene as usual L i (respectively R i ) as the left part (respectively the right part) of the message at the end of the i th round. Of course the one depending of none bits of the keys have not to be protected. Therefore these values must be masked and oblige the rst three rounds to be of the form:
BCD or BCE
The last three rounds must be of the form:
BCE or DCE
Taking in account these imperatives
is -for example-a good combination.
Resistance to DPA
5.4.1 Classical DPA: This countermeasure clearly protect the DES against DPA of order one. Indeed all the value depending of less than 36 bits of the key are masked by a random mask which is used only once.
Enhanced Attacks:
First we have to notice that this countermeasure is vulnerable against the superposition method guessing 12 bits of the key. Indeed the same mask is used in the rst and last round of the DES. So to counteract this attack we will from know consider that there's two dierent masks α 1 and α 2 which are used in the rst and last round of DES. It is easy to see that the proposed combination of round permit at the 7 th and 8 th round to switch from α 1 to α 2 because of the structure of E-round/B-round which leave their output/input unmasked. With evident notations we can get the following example of DES:
Let now consider n-th order DPA attack. The idea is to correlate several value to get the consumption of an important value. For us an important value is consider to be a value which could be guessed with less than 36 bit of the key. But we have seen that all these value are masked. Moreover the mask appear only once in all the calculus 3 , so even with high order correlation it is impossible to get any information about the masked value
Variation
If we want the mask never to appear several times (even on values depending on more than 36 bits of the key) one can use the following combination instead of the proposed one:
For paranoid people it is even possible to add two new masks and to mask every values depending on less than 56 bits of the key.
This method is modular: if one uses a protocol where the input or the output are not known, one can eliminate the associated mask.
Eective Construction of the Modied S-Boxes
In this section algorithms will be described using pseudo c-code.
Principle
It is easy to see that the following operation must be performed securely in order to construct the SboxesS 1 .
Generate a random α. Perform a permutation on α (permutation P −1 ). XOR a value (P −1 (α)) to a table.
For the construction ofS 2 , we need to:
Recuperate α because it is the same than inS 1 . Permutate it (E(α)). XOR to a table containing (1..63).
Of course securely means that all these operations must be done without giving any information about the consumption of α at any order (1,2 ...).
6. Classically it can be done bit per bit randomly. Against it only allow the attacker to get the hamming weight of the permuted value.
To speed up and have a memory gain, one could perform randomly the permutation quartet per quartet or even byte per byte. An idea could be to add some dummy values and perform the permutation. The dummy values would just not be considered after the permutation time.
XOR
Here a general method could be to XOR the value bit per bit in a random order to the table. Once again many compromise are possible to perform the XOR: do it byte per byte, add dummy values ...
Practical Considerations
The usual Sboxes are using 256 bytes. We need them but they could be stored in ROM. For the additional tables we need to store them in RAM.
In the normal security method (two masks α 1 and α 2 ) we need to store 4 new tables. So the total requirement in RAM is of 1024 bytes. We have seen that the construction of the Sboxes could be performed quite securely. Of course the most secure method is very slow and will really slow down the DES execution and use a lot of memory. The idea was just to show that it was theoretically possible to build the table without ltering any information 4 with a reasonable model of security 5 But we have also seen that it is possible to increase the speed and decrease the memory without loosing too much security.
Lets now have a look at how could be applied our countermeasure to the AES algorithm. Due to the higher number of tables (more than 16 instead of 8) and because they are bigger (8→8 bits instead of 6→4) compared to DES, our countermeasure would require about 8 Kb (or 16 Kb for a high security level) of RAM, a size which is too big for usual smartcards. Some simplications -which would unfortunately decrease the level of security-are therefore necessary to apply our countermeasure to AES implementation.
7 Real implementation on the DES algorithm This implementation have been submitted to our internal SPA/DPA/DFA laboratory which have tried to attack it without success.
Conclusion
Opposed to other proposed countermeasures, the unique masking method presents the following advantages:
It is actually the only protection known against high-order DPA.
The core of the DES is exactly the same than ordinary; so one can use with very light modication its implementation just adding the Sbox generation routine.
The important values are masked with a unique mask which never appear in the DES computation. For example with the transformed masking method the mask were appearing often (for a rst mask at the whole beginning and at each rounds). Here one do not even have to mask the entry or unmask the output.
The only part where the mask is appearing (but it could be randomly and bit per bit) does not depend neither of the key and neither of the message. Therefore the security is totally focused at this point.
This method is very exible and modular without important changes in the code: it could even be a compilation parameter to determine which level of security one wants.
A real implementation have been performed proving the feasibility of this countermeasure in reasonable time (less than 40ms with full protections).
